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ABSTRACT
We present new analytic techniques for inferring HTTP se-
mantics from passive observations of HTTPS that can infer
the value of important fields including the status-code,
Content-Type, and Server, and the presence or absence
of several additional HTTP header fields, e.g., Cookie and
Referer. Our goals are twofold: to better understand the
limitations of the confidentiality of HTTPS, and to explore be-
nign uses of traffic analysis such as application troubleshoot-
ing and malware detection that could replace HTTPS in-
terception and static private keys in some scenarios. We
found that our techniques improve the efficacy of malware
detection, but they do not enable more powerful website
fingerprinting attacks against Tor. Our broader set of results
raises concerns about the confidentiality goals of TLS relative
to a user’s expectation of privacy, warranting future research.
We apply our methods to the semantics of both HTTP/1.1
and HTTP/2 on data collected from automated runs of
Firefox 58.0, Chrome 63.0, and Tor Browser 7.0.11 in a lab
setting, and from applications running in a malware sand-
box. We obtain ground truth plaintext for a diverse set of
applications from the malware sandbox by extracting the key
material needed for decryption from RAM post-execution.
We developed an iterative approach to simultaneously solve
several multi-class (field values) and binary (field presence)
classification problems, and we show that our inference al-
gorithm achieves an unweighted F1 score greater than 0.900
for most HTTP fields examined.
1. INTRODUCTION
HTTPS, or HTTP-over-TLS, encrypts HTTP requests
and responses, and is foundational to internet security.
In this paper, we show that it is possible to infer the
HTTP method, status-code, and header fields without
decrypting the connection. Inferring HTTP protocol
semantics from observations of HTTPS connections aims
to provide “Limitless HTTP in an HTTPS World”, to
adapt an ironic phrase1. A primary goal for TLS is
confidentiality [9, 30]; our work explores places where
it fails due to the gap between theory and practice.
Semantic security [14, 15] requires that an attacker has
1Michael Scott’s unwittingly incongruous slogan from The
Office, “Limitless Paper in a Paperless World”.
negligible advantage in guessing any plaintext value,
but the cryptographic algorithms in TLS only meet
the lesser goal of indistinguishability of the plaintext
from messages of the same size. A cipher meeting the
lesser goal fails at semantic security when applied to
the message space consisting of the strings YES and NO.
While our proposed methods cannot undo encryption
entirely, they can often recover detailed information
about the underlying HTTP protocol plaintext, which
raises questions about what goals for HTTPS are most
appropriate and achievable. Many users would reject
a hypothetical variant of HTTPS that left the method,
content-type, and status codes unencrypted 98% of the
time, yet our analysis produces essentially the same
outcome on standard HTTPS implementations.
We frame the HTTP protocol semantics inference
problem as a number of disjoint multi-class and binary
classification problems. The multi-class classifiers model
field values, e.g., nginx-1.13 for the Server field and
text/html for the Content-Type field. The binary clas-
sifiers model the presence or absence of a field, e.g., the
presence of the Cookie and Referer fields in an HTTP
request. We designed classifiers for the method and
status-code fields as well as HTTP headers that were
well-represented in both our HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2
datasets and exhibited a reasonable level of diversity, i.e.,
the majority class label appeared in less than 80% of the
decrypted sessions. Many of these values are correlated
with other values in the same HTTP transaction or other
transactions in the same TLS connection, e.g., text/css
and text/javascript objects are often transferred us-
ing the same TLS connection. Using this intuition, we
developed an iterative classification strategy that utilizes
the header field inferences of related transactions that
were predicted during the previous iteration.
Our HTTP inference experiments uses data collected
from Firefox 58.0, Chrome 63.0, Tor Browser 7.0.11,
and data collected from a malware sandbox over a two
week period. Data collected in the first week was used
for training and data collected in the second week was
used for testing, which reflects how these methods would
be used in practice and highlights the importance of
maintaining a current training dataset. The malware
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sandbox data was generated by automated runs of sub-
mitted samples, and the browser data was generated
daily by collecting all connections after initiating a con-
nection to each website in the Alexa top-1,000 list.
These experiments were designed to test optimistic
and more realistic deployments of our techniques. In
the optimistic deployment, the splitting of the Firefox,
Chrome, and Tor datasets into training and testing sets
resulted in some overfitting. We believe these experi-
ments are still informative because inferences capturing
the purpose of common connections with high efficacy
are valuable, and our data collection strategy captured
dynamic content directly loaded by the target website,
e.g., news stories, and indirectly loaded by the target
website, e.g., referred advertising sites, resulting in a
more temporally diverse dataset than one would expect.
The HTTP inferences on the malware dataset reflected
settings where the model must generalize further. The
majority of the malware HTTP inferences’ test dataset
was composed of sites not present during training, and
the malware exhibited far more application diversity
As with all traffic analysis research, our results have
implications for both attackers and defenders; we touch
on both sides of this dichotomy throughout this paper,
and examine two popular research areas that embody
the moral tension of our results. The first, malware
detection, has become increasingly important with the
rise of encrypted traffic, and malware’s predictable use
of encryption to obfuscate its network behavior [1, 3].
The second, website fingerprinting, has serious privacy
implications and is most often examined in the context
of the Tor protocol in the literature. Our techniques did
not improve the performance of website fingerprinting,
which we attribute to Tor’s use of fixed-length cells and
multiplexing. On the other hand, we found that HTTP
protocol semantics inferences can improve the detec-
tion of TLS encrypted malware communication. We at-
tribute this increase in performance to the differences in
the distributions of HTTP header fields, e.g., requested
Content-Type and Server fields, and the presentation
of these learned concepts to the malware classifier.
HTTPS traffic is often subject to interception to detect
and block malicious content [11] and to passive monitor-
ing using static private keys [16]. Benign traffic analysis
offers an alternative that better respects the principle
of least privilege. Green et al. [16] cite application
troubleshooting and performance analysis as major mo-
tivations for passive HTTPS monitoring, and our HTTP
inferences can be directly applied to those use cases,
without third-party decryption or key escrow. Similarly,
benign traffic analysis may allow some network adminis-
trators to avoid the use of TLS termination proxies and
the associated security issues [11, 34]. This approach has
many advantages over actively probing servers. Specif-
ically, active probes have difficulty accounting for all
possible client configurations, the server and associated
software need to be active during the scan, and the
probes will not necessarily exercise problematic server
options. For example, 3.2% of the HTTP/2 connections
we observed used multiple web servers within the same
connection, and this behavior was often dependent on
the requested URI. These connections typically included
proxy servers, servers providing static and dynamic
content, and servers processing client data. Examples
of this behavior include YouTube’s YouTube Frontend
Proxy/sffe/ESF stack and CNN’s Akamai Resource
Optimizer/Apache/Apache-Coyote-1.1/nginx stack.
To implement the algorithms outlined in this paper,
the adversary or defender is assumed to have several
capabilities. First, they need the ability to passively
monitor some target network’s traffic. Second, they
need to have a large, diverse, and current corpus of
training data correlating the encrypted traffic patterns
observable on a network with the underlying HTTP
transactions. Third, the adversary or defender needs to
have the computational power to execute many classifiers
per observed TLS connection.
We make the following novel contributions:
1. We describe the first framework to infer an ex-
tensive set of HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 protocol
semantics inside of TLS and Tor encrypted tunnels
without performing decryption.
2. We test our algorithms on datasets based on Fire-
fox 58.0, Chrome 63.0, Tor Browser 7.0.11, and
data collected from a malware sandbox. We show
that we can reliably infer the semantics of HTTP
messages on all datasets except for Tor.
3. We provide the community with an open sourced
dataset containing the packet captures and the
cryptographic key material for the Firefox 58.0,
Chrome 63.0, and Tor Browser 7.0.11 datasets 2.
4. We apply our methods to TLS encrypted mal-
ware detection and Tor website fingerprinting. We
show that first modeling the semantics of encrypted
HTTP messages has the potential to improve mal-
ware detection, but fails to improve website finger-
printing due to Tor’s implemented defenses.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Relevant Protocols
The data and analysis of this paper revolves around mak-
ing inferences relative to 4 main protocols: HTTP/1.1
[12, 13], HTTP/2 [4], TLS 1.2 [9], and Tor [10]. Other
Transport Layer Security (TLS) versions, such as TLS
1.3 [30], did appear in our data, but represented less
than 5% of connections.
HTTP is the prominent protocol to facilitate data
transfer on the World Wide Web. HTTP/1.1 [12,
13] and HTTP/2 [4] are the most popular versions
of the HTTP protocol, and as shown in Table 1,
their representation was roughly equal in our datasets.
HTTP/1.1 is a stateless protocol that enables the
exchange of requests and responses between a client
and server. An HTTP/1.1 request begins with a
request-line specifying the method, request-target,
2Release is forthcoming.
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Figure 1: Firefox 58.0 HTTP/2 connection to google.com inside of a TLS encrypted tunnel. The gray boxes indicate
a single TLS application_data record, and the light blue boxes indicate HTTP/2 frames.
and HTTP-version of the request, and a response be-
gins with a status-line specifying the HTTP-version,
status-code, and reason-phrase. Following the
request-line or status-line, there is a potentially
unordered, case-insensitive list of header fields with their
associated values. In this paper, we make inferences
on the request-line’s method, the status-line’s
status-code, and many of the headers fields and
values, such as Referer, Server, and Content-Type.
HTTP/1.1 supports pipelining, where a client can send
2 or more requests before receiving the server’s response,
and the server will then send a series of responses in the
same order as they were requested.
HTTP/2 [4] was introduced to solve some of
HTTP/1.1’s shortcomings, e.g., by introducing multi-
plexing and header compression. HTTP/2 can multiplex
multiple streams over a single HTTP/2 connection by
using various frames to communicate the state of dif-
ferent streams. Figure 1 illustrates the creation of an
HTTP/2 connection inside of a TLS tunnel. The dark
gray boxes represent TLS application_data records,
and the light blue boxes represent HTTP/2 frames. The
client begins an HTTP/2 connection by sending a fixed
set of bytes indicating the connection is HTTP/2 im-
mediately followed by a SETTINGS frame containing the
parameters related to the client’s HTTP/2 configuration.
The client can send additional frames at this point, and
in Figure 1, the client sends a WINDOW_UPDATE frame
for flow control management, a set of PRIORITY frames
defining the priority of the multiple streams in the con-
nection, a HEADERS frame containing the request header
fields and values, and finally another PRIORITY frame.
The server must begin an HTTP/2 connection by send-
ing a SETTINGS frame. After an additional exchange
of SETTINGS frames, the server sends a HEADERS frame
containing the response header fields and values, and
finally a DATA frame containing the requested data. The
header fields are compressed using HPACK [28]. In
our experiments, we are only concerned with identifying
HEADERS frames and the values they contain.
HTTP/1.1 requests and responses are increasingly be-
ing secured by TLS, and browser vendors have stated
that they will not implement HTTP/2 without encryp-
tion. The TLS handshake begins with the exchange of
client_hello and server_hello records that establish
the cryptographic parameters needed to encrypt and au-
thenticate data. The client and server can also negotiate
the application layer protocol with these messages by
using the application_layer_protocol_negotiation
extension, where the values http/1.1 and h2 reasonably
refer to HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2. After establishing
a set of shared keys, the client and server each send
change_cipher_spec and finished records designat-
ing the end of the TLS handshake, and can now send
encrypted application_data records containing appli-
cation layer data. All of the dark gray boxes in Figure 1
represent application_data records.
Tor securely transmits and anonymizes TCP-based
application layer protocols, e.g., HTTP, using a com-
bination of TLS, its own encryption protocol, and an
overlay network [10]. The client creates a Tor connection
by first negotiating a TLS handshake with a Tor entry
node. After performing a Tor handshake, the client then
constructs a circuit by sending a CREATE2 cell to the
first onion router in the chain, where a cell is the basic
unit of communication similar to an HTTP/2 frame.
The onion router responds with a CREATED2 cell with
the information needed to derive a pair of 128-bit AES
keys to encrypt outgoing messages and decrypt incoming
messages. The client sends an RELAY_EXTEND2 cell to
extend the circuit to an additional onion router, and
will follow the same key establishment protocol with the
contents of the returned RELAY_EXTENDED2 cell. After
repeating this process multiple times, RELAY_DATA cells
are sequentially encrypted with the 128-bit AES keys
of each onion router in the circuit’s path. The contents
of RELAY_DATA cells carry the relevant application layer
data, e.g., TLS records needed to perform an additional
TLS handshake, and are null padded so that they always
contain 514 bytes. Figure 2 shows a JSON representa-
tion of an HTTP/1.1 GET request tunneled over TLS,
tunneled over Tor, and again tunneled over TLS.
2.2 Inferences on Encrypted Traffic
Inferring the content and intent of encrypted traffic has
a rich history in the academic literature. While not
directly targeting encrypted traffic, protocol-agnostic
network threat detection can be applied to encrypted
communication with reasonable results. These methods
rely on data features such as the number of packets sent
and periodicity of connections [17, 32]. Other methods
have used features specific to the TLS protocol to cor-
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Dataset Name
TLS HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2
Connections TX’s TX’s
firefox_h 61,091 72,828 132,685
chrome_h 379,734 515,022 561,666
tor_h 6,067 50,799 0
malware_h 86,083 182,498 14,734
enterprise_m 171,542 – –
malware_m 73,936 – –
tor_open_w 5,000 54,079 0
tor_censor_w 2,500 31,707 0
Table 1: Datasets ending with h are primarily used
for the HTTP protocol semantics classification exper-
iments (Section 4), datasets ending with m are used
for the malware classification experiments (Section 5.1),
and datasets ending with w are used for the website
fingerprinting experiments (Section 5.2).
relate the application’s identity, server’s identity, and
behavior of the interaction to improve detection [1].
Website fingerprinting is another well studied en-
crypted traffic inference goal [20, 27, 26, 39, 38]. This
problem is typically framed as the adversary attempt-
ing to identify connections to a small list of censored
websites over the Tor network by leveraging side chan-
nel information such as the size of packet bursts and
unique packet sizes [39]. Tor, especially when used with
pluggable transports, makes website fingerprinting sig-
nificantly more difficult, but the reliable detection of Tor
pluggable transports has been demonstrated [37].
More direct inferences on the body of encrypted HTTP
messages have also been studied. One example of this
class of attacks includes inferring the video a user is
watching over popular streaming services [29, 31]. Key-
word fingerprinting is a recent attack that identifies
individual queries sent to web applications, e.g., a search
query to Google, over Tor [25]. Inferring the size of an
encrypted resource is well known [36], and has recently
been used to identify users based on the unique, dynamic
content the web server sends them [35].
In contrast to previous work that makes inferences
on the HTTP body, we introduce methods that infer
the HTTP protocol semantics, thus understanding the
protocol machinery of HTTP transactions inside of a
TLS encrypted tunnel. Our results may provide value for
many of the goals described in this section, either directly
or indirectly as a means to normalize data features.
3. DATA
Throughout this paper, we use a combination of data
sources collected from automated runs in Linux-based
virtual machines, a commercial malware analysis sand-
box, and a real enterprise network. The Linux-based
VMs used CentOS 7 running on VMware ESXi. The
malware analysis sandbox executed tens-of-thousands
of unique binaries each day under Windows 7 and 10,
where we restricted our analysis to convicted samples
that used TLS to communicate. The enterprise network
had roughly 3,500 unique internal IP addresses per day.
With the notable exception of the data collected from
the enterprise network, we also collected the key mate-
rial necessary to decrypt the connections in all datasets.
This allowed us to correlate the decrypted HTTP trans-
actions with the observable data features. A summary
of the datasets is given in Table 1, where datasets ending
with _h are used for the HTTP inference experiments,
datasets ending with _m are used for the malware detec-
tion experiments, and datasets ending with _w are used
for the website fingerprinting experiments.
3.1 HTTP Inferences Data
To collect the ground truth for the application layer
requests and responses, the Linux-based VMs contacted
each site in the Alexa top-1,000 using Chrome 63.0, Fire-
fox 58.0, and Tor Browser 7.0.11. This data collection
was repeated each day for two weeks in December 2017.
Two weeks of malware data were collected from a com-
mercial malware analysis sandbox during October 2017.
Varying approaches were taken to collect the key mate-
rial necessary to decrypt the connections for each dataset
as explained in each subsection. When a given network
connection failed or decryption of that connection failed,
we discarded the sample resulting in different datasets
sizes. Session decryption failures occurred due to oc-
casional key extraction problems, e.g., the encryption
keys were not in memory during the memory snapshots
for Tor. This occurred uniformly at random and thus
unlikely to introduce bias.
The Firefox 58.0, Chrome 63.0, and Tor Browser 7.0.11
datasets used in this section are in the process of being
open sourced. The dataset contains packet captures of
the TLS/Tor sessions and the encryption keys needed
to decrypt the TLS/Tor sessions for the firefox_h,
chrome_h, and tor_h datasets.
3.1.1 Firefox 58.0 and Chrome 63.0
Both Firefox 58.0 and Chrome 63.0 support the export of
TLS 1.0-1.3 master secrets through the SSLKEYLOGFILE
environment variable. To prepare data collection
for a given browser and site pair, we first set the
SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable and begin collect-
ing the network traffic with tcpdump. Then we launch
the specified browser and site pair in private mode using
the Xvfb virtual window environment, and we allow the
process to run for 15 seconds. After 15 seconds, all
associated processes are killed, and we store the packet
capture and TLS master secrets for additional processing
as described in Section 3.1.5.
For Firefox, we decrypted a total of 31,175 HTTP/1.1
and 29,916 HTTP/2 connections. For Chrome, we
decrypted a total of 242,036 HTTP/1.1 and 137,698
HTTP/2 connections. We omitted browser-dependent
connections from our results, e.g., pocket recommenda-
tions in Firefox.
3.1.2 Tor Browser 7.0.11
A similar structure to the Firefox/Chrome data col-
lection is followed for Tor Browser, except that Tor
Browser 7.0.11 explicitly prevents the export of its key
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material due to security concerns. For this reason, in-
stead of setting the environment variable, we take mem-
ory snapshots of the tor and firefox processes every
3 seconds after the first second. The information in
/proc/<pid>/maps and /proc/<pid>/mem is used to as-
sociate the correct memory to the process ids. These
memory dumps are then post-processed as described in
Section 3.1.4 to extract the needed key material.
We decrypted a total of 6,067 TLS-Tor connections
and 50,799 HTTP/1.1 transactions. If we failed to de-
crypt the Tor tunnel or one of the underlying streams,
the sample was discarded. The difference in the number
of connections between the Tor dataset and the Fire-
fox/Chrome datasets was due to Tor multiplexing many
unique streams over a single connection.
3.1.3 Malware Sandbox
Each convicted malware sample was executed in either a
Windows 7 or Windows 10 virtual machine for 5 minutes.
After the 5 minute window, the packet capture was
stored and the virtual machine’s full memory snapshot
was analyzed as described in Section 3.1.4. Man-in-the-
middle or other more intrusive means to collect the key
material was decided against to avoid contaminating
the behavior of the malware. This decision did result
in fewer decrypted TLS connections than total TLS
connections because the TLS library could zeroize the
memory containing the key material. That being said, we
were still able to decrypt ∼80% of the TLS connections.
For the malware dataset, we decrypted a total of
82,177 HTTP/1.1 and 3,906 HTTP/2 connections.
We omitted browser-dependent and VM-dependent
connections from our results, e.g., connections to
ieonline.microsoft.com. We did not perform any
other filtering besides these obvious filters, i.e., we did
not attempt to distinguish between legitimate malicious
traffic and benign CDN connections.
This dataset is significantly more heterogeneous than
the previous datasets due to the malware samples not
being restricted to a single TLS library or a prescribed
set of websites. ∼70% of the malware samples used the
Schannel library provided by the operating system, with
the remaining samples using a variety of alternatives.
3.1.4 Extracting the Key Material
To decrypt the packet capture from a convicted malware
sample (Section 3.1.3) or a Tor instance (Section 3.1.2),
we extracted key material from the memory snapshot
taken in the final moments of the malware’s execution
or from a series of snapshots during the lifetime of the
Tor process. Prior work on scanning RAM for key mate-
rial exists [18, 19, 21], but prior techniques were neither
sufficiently lightweight nor general enough to directly
integrate into the commercial malware analysis sand-
box. The production use case required fully automated
forensic analysis of a previously unknown executable,
under strict CPU and time constraints. Our approach
instead leveraged the fact that malware primarily uses
established TLS libraries, especially ones built into the
targeted platform [3].
The cornerstone of key extraction is the fact that TLS
libraries tend to nest the master secret in a predictable
data structure, e.g., for OpenSSL:
struct ssl_session_st {
int ssl_version;
unsigned int key_arg_length;
unsigned char key_arg [8];
int master_key_length; // 48
unsigned char master_key [48];
unsigned int session_id_length;
unsigned char session_id [32];
...
In memory, this data structure appears as:
03 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
30 00 00 00 44 0E 70 5C 1C 22 45 07 6C 1C ED 0D
E3 74 DF E2 C9 71 AF 41 2C 0B E6 AF 70 32 6E C3
A3 2C A0 E6 3A 7A FF 0E F3 70 A2 8A 88 52 B2 2D
D1 B3 F6 F2 20 00 00 00 CD 31 58 BF DF 97 B0 F8
C0 86 BA 48 47 93 B0 A5 BA C1 5B 4B 35 37 7F 98
where the leading 0x0303 indicates TLS 1.2, and the
48-byte master secret is highlighted. It was there-
fore straightforward to write a regular expression that
yielded all OpenSSL master secrets in memory within
seconds (BoringSSL and Microsoft Schannel were simi-
lar). Mozilla NSS allocated the TLS master secret as a
standalone 48-byte buffer, which could in principle be
anywhere on the heap with no guaranteed context. How-
ever, we discovered that in practice NSS consistently
allocated the TLS master secret directly adjacent to
a predictable data structure: the struct that carried
the pointer to the master secret. This held true across
multiple operating systems and platforms, and we were
able to reliably extract NSS master secrets using regular
expressions. We were able to extract the Tor 128-bit
AES keys in a similar manner. We used the following
regular expressions to extract TLS master secrets and
AES keys:
BoringSSL : (\x02\x00|[\x00-\x03]\x03)\x00\x00(?=
.{2}.{2}\x30\x00\x00\x00(.{48})[\x00-
\x20]\x00\x00\x00)
NSS : \x11\x00\x00\x00(?=(.{8}\x30\x00\x00
\x00|.{4}.{8}\x30\x00\x00\x00.{4})
(.{48}))
OpenSSL : (\x02\x00|[\x00-\x03]\x03)\x00\x00(?=
.{4}.{8}\x30\x00\x00\x00(.{48})[\x00-
\x20]\x00\x00\x00)
Schannel : \x35\x6c\x73\x73(?=(\x02\x00|[\x00-
\x03]\x03)\x00\x00(.{4}.{8}.{4})
(.{48}))
Tor-AES : \x11\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00(?=
(.{16})(.{16}))
3.1.5 Decrypting the sessions
We wrote a custom tool to decrypt a packet capture
given a file containing the extracted key material. Our
tool supports the decryption of SSL 2.0-TLS 1.3, 200+
cipher suites, and can parse the HTTP/1.x, HTTP/2,
and Tor application layer protocols. For Tor traffic, it
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{
"tls_records": [
...
{
"type": "app_data",
"length": 1052,
"decrypted_data": {
"protocol": "Tor",
"length": 1028,
"cells": [
{
"circ_id": "xxxxxxxx",
"cell_type": "RELAY",
"command": "RELAY_DATA",
"stream_id": "xxxx",
"digest": "xxxxxxxx",
"length": 340,
"decrypted_data": {
"tls_records": [
{
"type": "app_data",
"length": 335,
"decrypted_data": {
"method": "GET",
"uri": "/",
"v": "HTTP /1.1" ,
"headers": [
...
],
...
Figure 2: An example of a decrypted HTTP/1.1 GET
request tunneled over Tor, represented in JSON.
can also decrypt the underlying RELAY and RELAY_EARLY
cells. If a decrypted stream contains a TLS session, the
stream will in turn be decrypted and the resulting appli-
cation layer data will be extracted. The results of the
decryption program are stored in JSON for convenient
manipulation by the machine learning preprocessors. As
an example, Figure 2 illustrates the decrypted output
of an HTTP/1.1 GET request tunneled over Tor.
Browsers that support exporting the TLS key mate-
rial through the SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable
adhere to the NSS key log format, which associates the
TLS client_random to a TLS master secret. The Tor
and malware datasets do not support this functionality,
and we were forced to create a new format that omitted
the client_random. In this case, we brute force the
decryption by attempting to decrypt a connection with
all of the extracted keys. For TLS 1.2, this involves
decrypting the small finished message, which is rel-
atively efficient. We attempt all master secrets until
the message is properly decoded. For the Tor RELAY
cells, we again try all available AES keys, making sure
to not disrupt the state of the previous onion layer’s
stream cipher in the case of a decryption failure. Once
we properly decrypt the RELAY cell by identifying a valid
relay command and recognized field, we add the cipher
to the circuit’s cipher list and return the decrypted data.
3.2 Malware Classification
For our malware classification experiments, we used
malware data from the same malware analysis sandbox
as above collected in November and December, 2017.
The enterprise network data was also collected during
the same time frame, but was uniformly sampled to
avoid severe class imbalance.
We collected the packet captures for each malware run,
but ignored the key material. We processed each packet
capture to extract the encrypted data in a similar format
to the previous section, but did not use the decryption
feature. We were able to associate the hash of the pro-
cess initiating the TLS connection with the 5-tuple of
the connection, and discarded any connections that were
not initiated by executables that were flagged as mal-
ware. We further cleaned the dataset by discarding pop-
ular CDNs and analytics sites such as gstatic.com and
google-analytics.com. This may have been overly ag-
gressive, but after manually inspecting the decrypted
contents of several hundred of these samples, we con-
cluded that they are much more likely to be benign.
Finally, the number of unique TLS server_name values
was also kept to a maximum of 50 uniformly at random
samples per month to avoid skewing our results towards
the performance on popular domains. Post-filtering, we
were left with 34,872 and 39,064 malicious TLS connec-
tions for November and December, respectively.
For the benign dataset, we collected TLS connections
from a real enterprise network using our tools during
November and December, 2017. We did not have ac-
cess to any key material in this case, and obviously
did not perform decryption. We filtered this data with
freely available IP blacklists. For the reasons described
above, we only allowed a maximum of 50 unique TLS
server_name values per month, chosen uniformly at
random, in the enterprise data. The mean number of
unique server_name values per month was ∼5, which
was increased by an order of magnitude to maintain
some information about prevalence. After uniformly
sampling and filtering, we were left with 87,016 and
84,526 benign TLS connections for November and De-
cember, respectively.
3.3 Website Fingerprinting
We aimed to emulate the standard website fingerprinting
open world experiment [27, 38]. The data was collected
in a similar fashion to what was described in Section
3.1.2, but with different website lists. While we did
extract the key material, we did not use the decrypted
data to train the website fingerprinting algorithms.
We used Tor Browser 7.0.11 to connect to each site
in a list of 50 censored websites. We repeated this cycle
until we were able to collect data from 50 successful
connections that were able to be decrypted for each
censored website. This data collection was performed
during the second week of January 2017.
During the second week of January 2017, we also used
our Tor Browser data collection strategy while connect-
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ing to each site in the Alexa top-10k. We excluded any
samples that failed to decrypt and sites that appeared
in the list of monitored sites. Similar to previous work,
we took the top 5,000 sites that remained.
4. INFERRING HTTP PROTOCOL SE-
MANTICS
Our framework to infer various attributes of HTTP in
encrypted network connections relies heavily on the la-
beled data of Section 3. Given that data, it is possible
to make a number of interesting inferences on encrypted
HTTP transactions without having to perform decryp-
tion. We used a standard random forest classifier with
100 trees for all experiments because they have been
shown to be a superior choice for network traffic analysis
tasks [2]. While alternative machine learning methods
could prove to be more performant, these investigations
are neither the focus nor in scope for this paper.
We report both the raw accuracy and the unweighted
F1 score for each problem. As explained in Section 4.2,
several of the inference problems are posed as multi-class
classification, and the unweighted F1 score provides a
better representation of the classifier’s performance on
the minority classes. It is defined as the unweighted
mean of the F1(Li) scores for each label Li in the multi-
class problem, where F1(Li) is defined as:
F1(Li) = 2× precisioni × recalli
precisioni + recalli
(1)
For all results, we segment the two weeks of data de-
scribed in Section 3.1 into training and testing datasets.
The first week of data is used for training, and the sec-
ond week of data is used for testing. Table 3 provides a
summary of all inference results.
4.1 Data Features
We use two categories of data features to classify HTTP
protocol semantics: features that are dependent on the
location (relative to the surrounding TLS records) of
the target TLS record containing the HTTP request
or response, and features derived from all packets in
a connection. For the location-specific feature set, we
analyze the current, preceding 5, and following 5 TLS
records. For each TLS record, we extract:
1. The number of packets
2. The number of packets with the TCP PUSH flag set
3. The average packet size in bytes
4. The type code of the TLS record
5. The TLS record size in bytes
6. The direction of the TLS record
We treat the counts and sizes as real-valued features,
the TLS type code as a categorical feature, and the
direction as a categorical feature where 0 indicates client
→ server, 1 indicates server → client, and 2 indicates
no TLS record. All features except direction are set to 0
if a TLS record does not exist, e.g., features related to
the following 5 TLS records when the target TLS record
ends the connection. We ignored timing-based features
because we found them to be unreliable.
For the connection-dependent features, we extracted
the number of packets, number of packets with the TCP
PUSH flag set, and the average packet size separately
for each direction of the connection. We also extracted
the sizes in bytes of the first 100 TLS records, where
the size is defined to be negative if the record was sent
by the server. This array was null padded. Finally, we
computed the connection’s total duration in seconds. All
of these values were represented as real-valued features.
Each sample for the classification problems discussed
in this section is composed of 174 data features: 66
record-dependent features, 6 features extracted from
each of the 11 TLS records analyzed, and 108 connection-
dependent features. The Tor experiments are the excep-
tion because we omit the connection-dependent features.
We found these features to be unreliable in the Tor
HTTP protocol semantics inference task, which is not
surprising considering the number of unique TLS con-
nections multiplexed over a single Tor tunnel.
4.2 Inferred HTTP Protocol Semantics
Before we can infer the values contained within an HTTP
request or response, we need to be able to identify which
TLS records contain a request or response. In our results,
this problem is labeled “message-type”, and it is a binary
classification problem where the labels indicate if a TLS
record contains at least one HTTP request or response.
We chose this approach because it lets us ignore many of
the complexities associated with HTTP/2 frame types
and Tor cell types.
For HTTP requests, we study 2 multi-class classifica-
tion problems: the method and Content-Type fields, and
3 binary classification problems: the Cookie, Referer,
and Origin fields. For the binary classification prob-
lems, we are attempting to determine if the field key
appears one or more times in the HTTP request.
For HTTP responses, we study 3 multi-class classifi-
cation problems: the status-code, Content-Type, and
Server fields, and 4 binary classification problems: the
Access-Control-Allow-Origin, Via, Accept-Ranges,
and Set-Cookie fields.
We focused on this set of problems because they were
well-represented in both our HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2
datasets and they exhibited a reasonable level of diversity.
As one would expect given our data collection strategy,
our problem selection is biased towards HTTP response
fields. As explained in Section 6, we believe the approach
outlined in this paper would translate to a larger set
of request-related problems if appropriate training data
was available.
4.2.1 Multi-Class Labels
Table 2 lists the labels for all multi-class classification
problems. There are some instances of ambiguity in
the HTTP request and response field values. For ex-
ample, the “application/octet” value for the response
Content-Type field can be used for multiple file types,
and the “nginx” value for the Server field can map to
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Problem HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2
Label Set Label Set
method GET, POST, GET, POST,
(req) OPTIONS, HEAD, OPTIONS, HEAD
PUT
Content json, plain json, plain
-Type
(req)
status 100, 200, 204, 206, 200, 204, 206,
-code 302, 303, 301, 301, 302, 303,
(resp) 304, 307, 404 304, 307, 404
Content html, javascript, html, javascript,
-type image, video, css, image, video, css,
(resp) octet, json, font, octet, son, font,
plain plain, protobuf
Server nginx-1.13/1.12, nginx-1.13/1.12,
(resp) nginx-1.11/1.10/1.8, nginx-1.11/1.10/1.6,
nginx-1.7/1.4, nginx, nginx-1.4/1.3, nginx,
cloudflare-nginx, cloudflare-nginx,
openresty, Apache, Apache, Coyote/1.1,
Coyote/1.1, IIS/8.5, Golfe2, sffe,
AmazonS3, cafe, ESF, GSE,
NetDNA/2.2, gws, UploadServer,
IIS-7.5/8.5, Akamai, Google,
jetty-9.4/9.0 Dreamlab, Tengine,
AmazonS3,
NetDNA/2.2
Table 2: Label sets for the multi-class HTTP protocol
semantics inference experiments. For HTTP/1.1, there
are 5 method, 2 request Content-Type, 10 status-code,
9 response Content-Type, and 18 Server labels. For
HTTP/2, there are 4 method, 2 request Content-Type,
9 status-code, 10 response Content-Type, and 25
Server labels.
multiple version. For our experiments, we take the field
value as is and do not attempt to relabel samples.
4.3 Iterative Classification
Many of the inference goals outlined in the previous
section are dependent on each other, e.g., the value
of the response Content-Type is correlated with the
Server value, or a response Content-Type is correlated
with other response Content-Type’s in the same TLS
connection. We take this fact into account by using an
iterative classification framework.
Given an encrypted TLS connection, we first deter-
mine the application layer protocol (alp) through the
TLS application_layer_protocol_negotiation ex-
tension. If this extension is absent, we use a classifier
based on the first 20 TLS record lengths to classify the
connection as either HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2. Given alp
Algorithm 1 Iterative HTTP Protocol Semantics In-
ference
1: procedure iterative semantics classify
2: given:
3: conn := features describing connection
4: alp← application_layer_protocol(conn)
5: recs← classify_message_types(conn, alp)
6: for rec ∈ recs do:
7: if rec.type 6= Headers then:
8: continue
9: get_record_features(rec, alp)
10: classify_semantics(rec, alp)
11: while not converged do:
12: for rec ∈ recs do:
13: if rec.type 6= Headers then:
14: continue
15: get_record_features(rec, alp)
16: get_inferred_features(rec, alp)
17: classify_semantics(rec, alp)
and the data features described in Section 4.1, we use a
binary classifier to identify each TLS application_data
record containing HTTP header fields. In this section
(but not Section 5), we discard connections with inaccu-
rately labeled TLS records, e.g., we classify an HTTP/2
HEADERS frame as a DATA frame. Although this process
resulted in a <1% reduction in the total number of sam-
ples classified, this process is important to note while
interpreting this section’s results.
For each TLS record identified as containing HTTP
header fields, we extract the Section 4.1 data features
and then apply the classifiers related to the request se-
mantics for client records and the response semantics
for server records. At this point, we associate the origi-
nal record’s data features with the classifier outputs for
all records containing HTTP header fields in the same
connection excluding the target classification problem in
the target record. This enhanced feature set has length
68 for HTTP/1.1 and length 74 for HTTP/2. The sub-
components of the enhanced feature vector correspond
to the sum of all other predicted outputs from the pre-
vious iteration after the predicted outputs have been
translated to an indicator vector. For example, if there
is a connection with 7 HTTP requests and the Referer
field was present in 4 out of the 6 non-target requests,
then the subcomponent of the enhanced feature vector
related to the Referer field would be [2, 4]. Given the
enhanced features, the HTTP protocol semantics are
classified using the TLS record’s data features and the
inferences from the previous iteration. We consider the
algorithm converged when no predicted outputs change
value. In our experiments, the iterative algorithm typi-
cally converged in 2 and at most 4 iterations.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the iterative classification
procedure. It uses multiple, intermediate classifiers, each
of which needs to be trained. These infer the application
layer protocol, the TLS records that contain the protocol
semantics of HTTP requests and responses, the HTTP
protocol semantics given only the target record’s features,
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Figure 3: Confusion matrices for the HTTP/1.1 response Content-Type header field value on the chrome h, malware h,
and tor h datasets. Matrix elements are left blank if there were no relevant labels in a particular dataset.
and the HTTP protocol semantics given all features.
When classifying an unseen test sample, two classifiers
per inference will be needed to carry out Algorithm 1.
Tor necessitates a minor exception to the iterative
algorithm due to the large number of unique TLS con-
nections that are multiplexed over a single TLS/Tor
connection. Instead of using all inferred HTTP values
within a connection for the enhanced feature vector, we
only use the predicted outputs of the preceding and
following 5 HTTP transactions in the Tor connection.
4.4 HTTP/1.1 Results
There were a total of 72,828, 515,022, 182,498, and
50,799 HTTP/1.1 transactions in firefox_h, chrome_h,
malware_h, and tor_h, respectively. This gave an av-
erage of ∼2.1 to ∼8.4 HTTP/1.1 transactions per TLS
connection depending on the dataset, with Tor being a
significant outlier. In these experiments, we used the
first 7 days of a dataset for training and the second 7
days of the same dataset for testing. We discuss this
limitation in Section 6 and provide additional results.
Table 3 provides the full set of results for each clas-
sification problem for both the initial pass and after
Algorithm 1 converges. We identified TLS records con-
taining HTTP header fields with an F1 score of over 0.99
for all datasets except for tor_h, which had a score of
∼0.87. This experiment highlights the relative difficulty
that the multiplexing facilitated by the Tor protocol
poses for traffic analysis relative to standalone TLS.
Most of the other HTTP/1.1 experiments followed a
similar pattern with the tor_h results being significantly
worse. We were able to effectively model several of
the binary classification problems for the tor_h dataset,
with the Cookie and Referer request fields having an F1
score over 0.75. The response fields performed noticeably
worse due to the multiplexing behavior of Tor.
For the other datasets, we were able to achieve sur-
prisingly competitive results across the majority of the
problems. We were even able to effectively model many
of the problems based on malware_h, which had a much
greater diversity of TLS clients and less overlap in sites
visited in the training and testing datasets. Figure 3
shows the full confusion matrices for the HTTP/1.1 re-
sponse Content-Type header field value for chrome_h,
malware_h, and tor_h. For this problem, we achieved
unweighted F1 scores of 0.919, 0.770, and 0.236 for the
chrome_h, malware_h, and tor_h datasets. There was
some overfitting to the majority class, image, which had
roughly twice as many samples in each dataset than
the next most represented class. Despite minor overfit-
ting in chrome_h and malware_h, Figure 3 demonstrates
the feasibility of this approach to infer the value of the
HTTP/1.1 response Content-Type header field value
in an encrypted TLS tunnel. For details on the other
classification problems, we refer the reader to Table 3.
4.5 HTTP/2 Results
There were a total of 132,685, 561,666, and 14,734
HTTP/2 transactions in firefox_h, chrome_h, and
malware_h, respectively. This gave an average of ∼4
HTTP/2 transactions per TLS connection across the
datasets. We performed the experiments in this section
following the same structure as the HTTP/1.1 experi-
ments. There were no HTTP/2 transactions in tor_h,
which was a result of the Tor Firefox process only being
configured to advertise http/1.1.
Similar to HTTP/1.1, Table 3 also provides the full set
of HTTP/2 results. We were able to identify TLS records
containing HTTP header fields with an F1 score of over
0.98 for all datasets. This slight drop in performance
was expected due to the more advanced flow control
mechanisms implemented by HTTP/2. In our datasets,
∼55% of the TLS-HTTP/2 connections employed some
form of pipelining or multiplexing. Only ∼15% of the
TLS-HTTP/1.1 connections employed pipelining.
The malware_h HTTP/2 results were worse than the
malware_h HTTP/1.1 results for most problems, but
we attribute this to having significantly less data in the
case of HTTP/2. Both chrome_h and firefox_h had
mostly comparable performance to the HTTP/1.1 experi-
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Problem Dataset
HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2
Single Pass Iterative Single Pass Iterative
F1 Score Acc F1 Score Acc F1 Score Acc F1 Score Acc
message-type
firefox h 0.996 0.996 0.987 0.991
chrome h 0.991 0.993 0.986 0.986
malware h 0.995 0.996 0.981 0.989
tor h 0.869 0.878
method
firefox h 0.909 0.990 0.943 0.995 0.815 0.992 0.989 0.997
chrome h 0.968 0.995 0.978 0.998 0.888 0.994 0.936 0.999
malware h 0.701 0.994 0.705 0.996 0.699 0.985 0.687 0.985
tor h 0.678 0.927 0.846 0.965
Content-Type
firefox h 0.973 0.982 0.967 0.978 0.905 0.917 0.982 0.985
chrome h 0.962 0.979 0.977 0.993 0.970 0.979 0.998 0.998
malware h 0.796 0.825 0.888 0.900 0.624 0.788 0.711 0.887
tor h 0.572 0.781 0.836 0.904
Cookie (b)
firefox h 0.954 0.965 0.967 0.974 0.864 0.882 0.941 0.948
chrome h 0.970 0.970 0.977 0.977 0.909 0.918 0.953 0.958
malware h 0.900 0.902 0.916 0.918 0.837 0.864 0.898 0.913
tor h 0.734 0.809 0.756 0.823
Referer (b)
firefox h 0.948 0.981 0.969 0.989 0.930 0.982 0.950 0.987
chrome h 0.968 0.993 0.978 0.995 0.892 0.986 0.933 0.991
malware h 0.914 0.923 0.928 0.935 0.880 0.881 0.907 0.907
tor h 0.830 0.859 0.885 0.905
Origin (b)
firefox h 0.940 0.978 0.973 0.990 0.870 0.974 0.952 0.989
chrome h 0.948 0.983 0.985 0.995 0.919 0.978 0.969 0.991
malware h 0.928 0.985 0.960 0.991 0.806 0.977 0.953 0.994
tor h 0.520 0.957 0.510 0.955
status-code
firefox h 0.806 0.984 0.856 0.989 0.750 0.986 0.820 0.993
chrome h 0.887 0.978 0.922 0.992 0.780 0.981 0.848 0.990
malware h 0.569 0.922 0.684 0.962 0.754 0.936 0.829 0.960
tor h
Content-Type
firefox h 0.817 0.919 0.848 0.923 0.652 0.778 0.766 0.825
chrome h 0.875 0.940 0.919 0.957 0.777 0.882 0.880 0.917
malware h 0.735 0.805 0.770 0.866 0.624 0.788 0.711 0.887
tor h 0.211 0.491 0.236 0.556
Server
firefox h 0.894 0.924 0.916 0.969 0.878 0.939 0.948 0.985
chrome h 0.958 0.962 0.977 0.986 0.935 0.965 0.953 0.988
malware h 0.771 0.891 0.814 0.943 0.806 0.895 0.910 0.924
tor h 0.164 0.476 0.153 0.406
Etag (b)
firefox h 0.936 0.937 0.958 0.958 0.838 0.839 0.909 0.909
chrome h 0.955 0.964 0.969 0.975 0.905 0.914 0.954 0.959
malware h 0.866 0.908 0.897 0.927 0.787 0.913 0.878 0.943
tor h 0.606 0.651 0.676 0.703
Via (b)
firefox h 0.962 0.965 0.975 0.976 0.892 0.936 0.934 0.961
chrome h 0.958 0.985 0.964 0.987 0.918 0.959 0.960 0.979
malware h 0.798 0.970 0.836 0.975 0.921 0.974 0.732 0.979
tor h 0.491 0.860 0.547 0.859
Accept-Ranges (b)
firefox h 0.946 0.946 0.956 0.956 0.825 0.831 0.909 0.911
chrome h 0.959 0.969 0.975 0.980 0.901 0.904 0.954 0.956
malware h 0.895 0.912 0.929 0.940 0.910 0.932 0.947 0.959
tor h 0.621 0.629 0.673 0.680
Set-Cookie (b)
firefox h 0.949 0.982 0.964 0.987 0.828 0.939 0.920 0.968
chrome h 0.978 0.979 0.987 0.988 0.923 0.963 0.956 0.978
malware h 0.837 0.939 0.880 0.953 0.857 0.946 0.895 0.959
tor h 0.548 0.856 0.604 0.861
Table 3: Summary of the HTTP protocol semantics inference results.
10
200 302 204 301 307 304 206 404 303
200
302
204
301
307
304
206
404
303
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.09 0.88 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.03 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.08 0.01 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.07 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.00
0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00
0.39 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56
(a) firefox h
200 302 204 301 307 304 206 404 303
200
302
204
301
307
304
206
404
303
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.02 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.02 0.02 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.04 0.01 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.16 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.48 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.00
0.42 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.00
0.15 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78
(b) chrome h
200 302 204 301 307 304 206 404 303
200
302
204
301
307
304
206
404
303
0.97 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.06 0.90 0.02 0.02 0.00
0.07 0.00 0.89 0.04 0.00
0.02 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.00
0.65 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.33
(c) malware h
Figure 4: Confusion matrices for the HTTP/2 status-code value on the firefox h, chrome h, and malware h datasets.
Matrix elements are left blank if there were no relevant labels in a particular dataset.
ments. Compared to the HTTP/1.1 results, the iterative
algorithm performed exceptionally well on some prob-
lems: request method, request Cookie, request Origin,
response Content-Type, and response Server. In these
cases, the iterative algorithm was able to improve per-
formance by effectively leveraging HTTP/2’s greater
number of HTTP transactions per TLS connection.
Figure 4 shows the confusion matrices for the HTTP/2
status-code header on the firefox_h, chrome_h, and
malware_h datasets, which had F1 scores of 0.856, 0.922,
and 0.684, respectively. Similar to other problems, the
majority of the misclassifications were due to underrepre-
sented classes being assigned to well represented classes,
e.g., 206 → 200. A more diverse and representative
dataset should help mitigate these issues. The full set
of results for the HTTP/2 classification problems are
given in Table 3.
5. USE CASES
We now examine two possible applications of our tech-
niques: improved malware detection and website finger-
printing. Our goal in this section is to test the feasibility
of using the inferences introduced in this paper to im-
prove the performance of these use cases; we did not
attempt to demonstrate hyper-optimized results. We
used the full two weeks of the previous datasets to train
the classifiers needed to perform our iterative HTTP
protocol semantics inferences. We then used the trained
classifiers and Algorithm 1 to enrich the samples related
to the two use cases. If available, we did not make use
of any decrypted data features for samples in this sec-
tion. firefox_h, chrome_h, and malware_h were used
to train the classifiers needed for Section 5.1, and tor_h
was used to train the classifiers needed for Section 5.2.
5.1 Malware Detection
As described in Section 3.2, we used enterprise_m and
malware_m from Table 1 to test if first inferring the se-
mantics of encrypted HTTP transactions can improve
malware detection. We used the November data for
Feature Set F1 Score Precision Recall Acc
Standard 0.951 0.951 0.915 0.958
Enriched 0.979 0.984 0.959 0.982
Table 4: Malware classification results using a standard
feature set and an enriched feature set that takes advan-
tage of HTTP protocol semantics inferences.
training and the December data for testing. We ex-
plored two feature sets for this problem. The standard
feature set included the 108 connection-dependent fea-
tures described in Section 4.1. In the standard set, we
also used TLS-specific features:
1. Binary features for the 100 most commonly offered
cipher suites
2. Binary features for the 25 most commonly adver-
tised TLS extensions (including GREASE exten-
sions [5], which are treated as a single feature)
3. A categorical feature for the selected cipher suite
There were 234 total features for the standard set. The
enhanced set included all 234 features of the standard
set, and the features representing the predicted values
from Algorithm 1 and described in Section 4.3. In total,
there were either 302 features for HTTP/1.1 TLS con-
nections or 308 features for HTTP/2 TLS connections.
We trained a standard random forest model as described
in Section 4 to classify the test samples.
As Table 4 demonstrates, applying the iterative HTTP
protocol semantics classifier and learning an intermedi-
ate representation of the HTTP transactions within the
encrypted TLS tunnel significantly helped the perfor-
mance of the classifier. The header inferences increased
the F1 score from 0.951 to 0.979, and had similar im-
pacts to precision and recall. These results are a notable
improvement over previous results on malware TLS de-
tection [3], which relied on additional data features such
as server certificates to obtain higher accuracy. Because
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Rank Standard Enriched
1 8th Record Length 8th Record Length
2 1st Record Length HTTP: Set-Cookie
3 # Out Bytes # Out Bytes
4 # Out Records 1st Record Length
5 Offered Cipher Suite: HTTP: Referer
DHE_DSS_WITH_
AES_256_CBC_SHA
6 # In Records HTTP: Content-Type
7 # In Bytes # In Records
8 Advertised Extension: HTTP: status-code
channel_id
9 Duration # Out Packets
10 7th Record Length HTTP: method
Table 5: The 10 most important features for classifying
malware with the standard and enhanced features sets.
TLS 1.3 obfuscates certificates [30], new techniques will
be needed to address this use case.
Table 5 lists the 10 most importance features for clas-
sification in the standard and enriched feature sets. This
ranking was generated by computing the Gini feature
importance [7]. From standard feature set, the first TLS
record length corresponding to the client_hello was
informative. The 7th and 8th TLS record lengths were
also informative because the enterprise dataset contained
more examples of session resumption. From the enriched
feature set, HTTP fields aimed at tracking and keeping
state were among the most useful, e.g., Set-Cookie and
Referer. The method and status-code were also in
the top 10 due to malware being more likely to perform
a GET request with a resulting 404 status code.
The performance of the enriched feature set would still
yield too many false positives on a real network, but it
is only looking at data features related to a single TLS
session. Our techniques could easily be incorporated into
a more comprehensive network monitoring architecture
that correlates multiple connections and independent
data sources.
5.2 Website Fingerprinting
We used tor_open_w and tor_censor_w from Table 1
in our website fingerprinting experiments. Similar to pre-
vious work on website fingerprinting [39], tor_censor_w
contained 50 samples per monitored site from a list of 50
sites currently blocked in some countries pertaining to
information dissemination (e.g., twitter.com), covert
communication (e.g., torproject.org), and porno-
graphic imagery. tor_open_w contained 5,000 non-
monitored samples, where each sample is a unique con-
nection to a website in the Alexa top-10k. These sites
were contacted in order, and we selected the first 5,000
sites that properly decrypted and did not have any
HTTP requests to a monitored site.
The feature set in this experiment was based on the fea-
tures used by Wang et al. [39], and included total packet
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Figure 5: Website fingerprinting learning curve as the
number of samples per blocked site is adjusted.
count, unique packet lengths, several counts related to
burst patterns, and the lengths of the first 20 packets.
A more detailed description of these features is provided
by Wang et al. [39]. We took advantage of Wang et al.’s
k-NN classifier and hyperparameter learning algorithms
with kreco fixed to the suggested value of 5 [39]. We
used 10-fold CV, ensuring non-monitored sites were not
in the training and testing sets simultaneously.
Figure 5 provides the results of this experiment as we
adjust the number of unique samples per monitored site
from 5 to 50 in increments of 5. The introduction of the
header inferences seem to be strictly adding noise that
is effectively filtered out during the weight adjustment
algorithm of Wang et al. In Section 6, we provide some
references that may increase the power of this attack.
6. DISCUSSION
We have shown that it is possible to infer HTTP protocol
semantics within encrypted TLS tunnels, but our results
depend on the existence of a rich source of labeled data
correlating the encrypted traffic patterns observable on
a network with the underlying HTTP transactions. The
results based on malware_h were the closest to a real-
world scenario where the testing dataset consisted of
many different clients visiting servers unseen in training.
Table 6 shows the performance of our algorithm when
training on chrome_h and testing on firefox_h, and
as expected, the results are worse. One observation we
made was the difference by the two browsers in utilizing
HTTP/1.1 pipelining: 10% of TLS-HTTP/1.1 Chrome
connections used pipelining versus 25% for Firefox. In
many of these cases, Chrome would create multiple TLS
connections instead of pipelining the requests. There
are undoubtedly other differences that would cause the
models to not easily transfer between browsers and even
operating systems. A deployable system would need
to first recognize the operating system and application,
which can be accomplished by readily available tools
[8, 23], and then apply the relevant HTTP protocol
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Problem F1 Score Accuracy
method 0.717 0.971
Content-Type 0.790 0.841
status-code 0.492 0.869
Content-Type 0.400 0.421
Server 0.741 0.830
Table 6: HTTP/1.1 semantics inference results when
training with chrome_h and testing with firefox_h.
semantics models to the data features extracted from
the encrypted tunnel. This would require curating an
extensive dataset, which is not an unreasonable burden
for a well-funded department.
Our results indicated that the Tor protocol provides
a suitable defense for entities wishing to defend against
the methods of this paper. The fixed-length Tor cells
and multiplexing many distinct TLS connections over a
single TLS-Tor connection reduces the signal in many
of our chosen features. This can be seen to a lesser
extent in Table 3 with respect to HTTP/2 over TLS
due to HTTP/2’s greater use of pipelining and multi-
plexing in our datasets. Multiplexing communication to
different origins over a single HTTP/2 connection has
been recently proposed [6, 24], which would most likely
degrade our results even further. Wang and Goldberg
put forward several algorithms to properly segment and
de-noise Tor streams [38]. Preprocessing tor_h with
Wang and Goldberg’s methods may increase the effi-
cacy of our algorithms, and their techniques may also
have applications to future implementations of HTTP/2.
These investigations are left for future work.
In the context of malware detection, our results on
Tor demonstrated that malware employing common eva-
sion strategies [10, 22, 40] should be able to mislead our
HTTP protocol semantics inferences, resulting in the
addition of noisy data features to the malware classifier.
These evasion strategies can be detected [37]. Although
these detection methods are not specific to malware com-
munication, they could be used to inform the malware
classifier to avoid using the inferred HTTP data features.
From an adversarial point-of-view, it is also important
to note that the feature importances given in Table 5 are
not static, and the relative importance of any particular
feature is likely to change over time. However, with
continual training, malware classifiers will be able to
take advantage of the insights provided by the HTTP
inferences presented in this paper.
Our paper’s intended purpose is to highlight a funda-
mental, novel framework that has many potential appli-
cations. While we leave developing these applications to
future work, we believe our techniques can be applied
to de-anonymizing a NAT’d user’s browsing history by
using the presence of the Referer/Origin/Cookie fields
together with timestamps. Our techniques can also iden-
tify transmitted file sizes at a much higher resolution by
annotating each TLS record with the HTTP/2 frame
types it contains, and discarding TLS records that do
not contain relevant DATA frames. An organization could
leverage a known set of sensitive file sizes correlated with
endpoints, and use the methods presented in this paper
to identify out-of-policy file movements. Finally, for
maintenance and debugging of servers on a network, our
method is superior to active scanning, which can be
inefficient and ineffective due to limited client config-
urations and imperfect information about the client’s
request and server’s response. The HTTP inference
techniques presented in this paper can identify problems
without relying on active scanning or TLS termination
proxies.
7. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The majority of our data was collected in a lab environ-
ment and did not contain sensitive information. The
Tor data collection adhered to the ethical Tor research
guidelines [33]. The data collection for the malware de-
tection experiments did contain highly confidential and
sensitive data. We followed all institutional procedures,
and obtained the appropriate authorizations. While col-
lecting the data, all IP addresses and enterprise user
names were anonymized via deterministic encryption.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have shown that it is possible to infer
many of the underlying HTTP protocol features without
needing to compromise the encryption that secures the
HTTPS protocol. Our framework can correctly iden-
tify HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 records transmitted over
HTTPS with F1 scores greater than 0.99 and 0.98, re-
spectively. Once the HTTP records are identified, our
system uses multi-class classification to identify the value
of several fields, e.g., Content-Type, and binary classifi-
cation to identify the presence or absence of additional
fields, e.g., Cookie. We have demonstrated competitive
results on datasets composed of hundreds-of-thousands
of encrypted HTTP transactions taken from Firefox
58.0, Chrome 63.0, and a malware analysis sandbox. We
also applied our techniques to Tor Browser 7.0.11, but
achieved significantly lower accuracies, suggesting that
the Tor protocol is robust against these methods.
Inferences on the semantics of HTTP have intrinsic
value that can be used by both attackers and defend-
ers. For example, network administrators can use these
inferences to passively monitor dynamic, complex net-
works to ensure a proper security posture and perform
debugging without the need of TLS termination proxies,
and attackers can use these inferences to de-anonymize
a NAT’d user’s browsing history. We performed two ex-
periments that highlight this moral tension: leveraging
encrypted HTTP inferences to improve malware detec-
tion and website fingerprinting over Tor. We showed that
our techniques can improve the detection of encrypted
malware communication, but they failed to improve
website fingerprinting due to the defense mechanisms
implemented by the Tor protocol. Given our broader set
of results and the increasing sophistication of network
traffic analysis techniques, future research is needed to
evaluate the confidentiality goals of TLS with respect to
users’ expectations of privacy.
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